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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Carolyn Jaffe Andrew*
Abstractor

Abortion-People v. Ballard, 32 Cal. Rptr. 233
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant, a physician, was
convicted on two counts of illegal abortion. On
appeal, defendant contended that the evidence was
insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain the
judgment. The California District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that since each "abortee" had
had a miscarriage and was in ill health because of
self-imposed abortive practices at the time she
went to see defendant, there was no evidence
tending to prove a necessary element of the crimei.e., that defendant thought or believed either or
both of the women to be pregnant; that even
assuming arguendo .that defendant did perform
an abortion on each or either of the women, the
evidence was undisputed that each was in a
dangerous state of health at the time, and there
was no evidence tending to prove yet another
essential element of the offense-i.e., that abortion was not reasonably necessary to save the
woman's life. The Court noted that the burden of
proof is on the prosecution to establish lack of
necessity for the operation as an element of the
case.
Admission by Silence-People v. Reese, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 561 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of kidnapping and of three counts of
robbery. On appeal, defendant contended that the
district attorney committed prejudicial misconduct of a reversible nature in making the following arguments: first, that defendant's silence
when accused of committing one of the crimes was
conduct inconsistent with innocence; second, that
defendant's failure to disclose his alibi when
questioned about the crime could be considered
inconsistent with innocence; and third, that some
of defendant's alibi witnesses were lying and bad
committed perjury. The California District Court
of Appeal reversed, holding that the first argument complained of was proper; but in adding the
* Ford Foundation Fellow in Criminal Law, Northwestern University School of Law.

second argument to the first argument, the district attorney in effect told the jury that a defendant, when accused, is required not only to
deny the charge, but also to disclose his alibi
defense, if he has one, and the second argument
was patently erroneous; and that by use of the
third argument the district attorney indirectly
branded defendant's witnesses as possible felons,
while he could not on cross-examination have
charged a witness with commission of a felony
of which he had not been convicted; and that,
considered together, the two erroneous arguments
to the jury constituted reversible error.
Admission by Silence-State v. Harley, 383
P.2d 247 (N.M. 1963). Defendant was convicted
of armed robbery. On appeal, defendant contended
that the trial court erroneously allowed the jury
to consider defendant's failure to deny a codefendant's statements accusing defendant. The
Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed and
remanded, holding that the rule of evidence which
allows a person's silence to be construed as an
admission of the truth of matters stated in his
presence must be applied with caution; and that
where defendant remained silent in the face of the
accusation under a claim of right to do so until
counsel could be consulted, there existed no circumstance which would permit the jury to consider either what the accused did when confronted
by the accusation, or the content thereof.
Admissions-Prescoe v. State, 191 A.2d 226
(Md. 1963); Stewart ",. State, 193 A.2d 40 (Md.
1963). See Confessions, infra.
Alibi-People v. Reese, 33 Cal. Rptr. 561 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963). See Admission by Silence, supra.
Alibi-Poe t. State, 370 S.W.2d 488 (Tenn.
1963). Defendant was convicted of assault and
battery with intent to commit rape. On appeal,
defendant contended that the trial judge com-
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mitted reversible error in failing to instruct the
jury on the issue of alibi. The Supreme" Court of
Tennessee reversed and remanded, holding that a
trial judge in a criminal case has a duty to give the
jury a complete charge on the law applicable to
the facts of the case, and a defendant has a right
to have every issue of fact raised by the evidence
and material to his defense submitted to the jury
upon proper instructions; that the issue of alibi
in this case was raised by the evidence, and,
because it was a close case on the facts and alibi
was practically the only defense, the issue was
essential to the defense; and consequently, the
trial judge should have given the jury proper
instructions which would fairly submit to them
the issue of defendant's alibi even though defendant failed to request such instruction, since in
light of the circumstances of the case, the alibi
issue raised by the evidence was fundamental to
his defense and an alibi instruction essential to a
fair trial.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Hicks v. State,
156 So. 2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendants were convicted of grand larceny. On
appeal, defendants contended that testimony
concerning the results of an unlawful search was
admitted as evidence against them. The Florida
District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded,
holding that where a Georgia sheriff purported to
arrest defendants in Alabama, in which state he
had no official standing, the "arrest," if valid,
must be sustained as a citizen's arrest; that one
Mooney's identification, in the Georgia sheriff's
presence, of defendants as those who sold tires to
him at an unreasonably low price, was insufficient
to support a valid citizen's arrest; that pursuant
to their illegal arrests by the Georgia sheriff,
defendants were searched in Alabama by an
Alabama officer, to which search defendants
yielded only because of the apparent authority of
the Alabama officer, who was acting under color
of his official position; and since the testimony
complained of concerned the results of the Alabama
state officer's illegal search of defendants, the
testimony should not have been admitted against
defendants in the Florida criminal prosecution.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Zabala,
31 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant was convicted of possessing marijuana.
On appeal, defendant contended that marijuana

found in his clothing as a result of his iflegal arrest
should not have been admitted in evidence. The
California District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that since defendant was arrested without
a warrant, the burden was on the People to show
proper justification; that the arresting officers'
knowledge of defendant's former record and reputation, and the fact that they observed defendant
acting furtively and suspiciously by walking
away from a uniformed officer at an increasingly
rapid pace, did not constitute probable cause to
arrest defendant; that in addition to knowledge of
defendant's previous record and observation of
his furtiveness, the officers possessed information
received from an informer, but since they failed
to disclose in their testimony what information was
related, the information could not be considered
as tending to prove probable cause; and since the
search of defendant's clothing was inextricably
connected with his illegal arrest, the fruits of the
search were inadmissible and defendant's conviction must be reversed.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-State v. Beck, 191
N.E.2d 825 (Ohio 1963). See Informers, infra.
Confessions-People v. Freeland, 32 Cal. Rptr.
132 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant was convicted of burglary. On appeal, defendant contended that a confession obtained as a product of
an unlawful arrest was admitted as evidence
against him. The California District Court of
Appeal affirmed, holding that, as a matter of law,
defendant was in custody as the result of an
unconstitutional seizure of his person; that the
basic distinction between evidence, whether
physical or testimonial, seized in violation of
search and seizure provisions and voluntary
statements made during a period of illegal detention is that in the case of voluntary statements, there is lacking the pivotal factor-the
causal relation between the illegality and the
questioned evidence; that the ultimate test of
admissibility of a confession is whether or not it
was the product of a rational intellect and free
will; and since defendant's confession was a direct
result of his voluntary choice and not the direct
result of his illegal arrest, the confession was
properly admitted in evidence.
Confessions-Prescoev. State, 191 A.2d 226 (Md.
1963); Stewart v. State, 193 A.2d 40 (Md. 1963).
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland in two recent
cases has refused to hold concededly voluntary
oral statements inadmissible as the "fruits" of
concededly illegal arrests. In the Prescoe case, the
Maryland Court adhered to the test of voluntariness for purposes of determining the admissibility of an oral confession, regardless of whether
it was made during a period of illegal detention
subsequent to an unlawful arrest. The Court
stated that it had discovered no case decided
either by the United States Supreme Court
involving a state prosecution or by the Maryland
Court which would compel the exclusion of a
confession voluntarily given. The Court in Stewart
v. State reaffirmed its Prescoe holding by refusing
to apply to defendant's voluntary admissions (not
amounting to confessions), made while defendant
was in custody after an illegal arrest, a test of
admissibility different from that announced in
Prescoe. The Court rejected defendant's argument
that a different rule should be applied to admissions, stating that the same test of admissibilitywhether the statement was voluntary-was
applicable to admissions and confessions alike.
Confessions-State v. Biron, 123 N.W.2d 392
(Minn. 1963). Defendant was convicted of third
degree murder. On appeal, defendant contended
that a written confession obtained by means of
improper inducements and representations was
introduced in evidence against him in violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota reversed and granted a new
trial, holding that since the issue involved a basic
constitutional right, the standards upon which the
issue of voluntariness must be determined were
those expressed by United States Supreme Court
decisions; that "'the true test of admissibility is
that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and
without compulsion or inducement of any sort'
[quoting from Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503, abstracted at 54 J. Cmnm. L., C. & P.S. 490
(1963)]; and that, accepting this test, the statements and representations made by investigating
dfficers to defendant, aged 18, that if he confessed,
he might be tried by juvenile rather than adult
court or that a lesser degree of homicide might be
charged, and that they would try to help him
receive such treatment, constituted a sufficient
inducement to deprive the confession of its voluntary character.
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Continuance-State v. Black, 132 S.E.2d 5
(S.C. 1963). See Right to Counsel, infra.
Credit Cards-United States v. Mingo, 217 F.
Supp. 729 (M.D. Fla. 1963); Barack v. United
States, 317 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1963). See Interstate
Transportation of False Securities, infra.
Cross-Examination-State v. Swenson, 382
P.2d 614 (Wash. 1963); Pettit v. Rhay, 383 P.2d
889 (Wash. 1963). See Due Process of Law, infra.
Derivative Evidence-Prescoe v. State, 191
A.2d 226 (Md. 1963); Stewart v. State, 193 A.2d
40 (Md. 1963). See Confessions, supra.
Discovery-Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80
(5th Cir. 1963). See Due Process of Law, infra.
Discovery-Commonwealth v. Caplan, 192 A.2d
894 (Pa. 1963). Defendant's petition for discovery
was granted by the trial court, and the district
attorney filed a petition in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court for writ of mandamus to challenge
the discovery granted. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and
stayed all proceedings for 60 days, holding that
since a trial court's grant of a discovery petition
is discretionary, prohibition, not mandamus, was
the proper remedy, since mandamus lies to compel
a ministerial act but not to review a discretionary
act. The Court stayed the proceedings to permit
the district attorney to petition for writ of prohibition in light of the importance of the substantive questions raised.
Discovery-Commonwealth v. Smith, 192 A.2d
671 (Pa. 1963); People v. Parham, 33 Cal. Rptr.
497 (1963). The Supreme Courts of two states
have recently ruled on the question whether, for
purposes of impeachment, a criminal defendant is
entitled to statements in the possession of the
FBI.
In Commonwealth v. Smith, defendant contended
that the trial court's refusal to issue a subpoena
to obtain FBI records for impeachment purposes
deprived him of due process of law. Noting that
the trial judge's refusal followed his receiving
information from an FBI representative that the
Bureau would not produce the reports because
they contained confidential information, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding
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that since the FBI, not the Commonwealth,
denied defendant access to the requested information, the doctrine of Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957)-that it is unfair for the prosecution to use a witness against defendant and then
deny access to prior statements for purposes of
impeachment-did not apply.
In a similar case, People v. Parham,the Supreme
Court of California held that where a subpoena
which the trial court issued for production of
statements in the possession of the FBI was not
obeyed because of an order of the U.S. Attorney
General, defendant was not entitled to have
stricken from the record the testimony of the
identification witnesses whose statements he
sought for impeachment purposes. The Court
stated that denial of his motion to strike did not
deprive defendant of a fair trial, since the statements were unavailable by force of federal law,
not because of any improper activity by state
officials. [See Search and Seizure, infra, for
another issue decided in the Parhamcase.]
Double Jeopardy-Krulka v. Spinuzzi, 384
P.2d 928 (Colo. 1963). Petitioner was tried for
murder, and the trial court granted his motion
for directed verdict of acquittal. On review of the
judgment of acquittal by writ of error, the
Colorado Supreme Court disapproved the trial
court's action and held that the evidence required
submission of the charge of first degree murder to
the jury. The People then obtained from the
original trial court reissuance of petitioner's
arrest warrant, and petitioner was rearrested.
Petitioner's application for habeas corpus from
this confinement was granted. On error, respondent contended that the former trial did not
constitute jeopardy, inasmuch as petitioner had
not been tried for the offense in a trial free from
grievous error. The Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that jeopardy attached when the
jury was empaneled and sworn, and the Colorado
Supreme Court's disapproval of the result of
petitioner's first trial did not alter this fact.
Due Process of Law-Ashley v. Texas, 319
F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963). Petitioners were convicted of murder in a Texas state court and
sentenced to death. The Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Texas denied petitioners' applications for habeas corpus and
stay of execution, and the Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit granted a stay pending final
disposition of the case. On appeal, petitioners
contended that failure of the District Attorney to
inform them that two psychiatrists employed by
the prosecution were of the opinion that petitioners
were legally incompetent constituted a denial of
their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, directing the District Court to issue the
writ without precluding a new trial by the State of
Texas and ordering that the stay of execution be
continued until the matter was finally disposed of.
The Court of Appeals held that where the county
psychiatrist and a psychiatrist employed by
petitioners were of the opinion that petitioners
were legally competent and no defense of insanity
was interposed at the trial, the conceded failure of
the District Attorney to inform petitioners'
counsel of the fact, known to the District Attorney
but not to petitioners' counsel, that opinions
favorable to petitioners had been reached by
specialists engaged by the state constituted such
fundamental unfairness as to amount to a denial
of due process of law. The Court rejected the
State's argument that the specialists could at
most give opinion evidence, and that no court
has held that failure of the prosecution to disclose a mere opinion, even one favorable to the
defense, works a deprivation of constitutional
rights, stating that the fact that such opinion had
been formed by such obviously objective experts
was of such potentially great significance to
petitioners in the strategy and conduct of their
defense that failure to disclose the fact that these
opinions existed assumed due process proportions.
Due Process of Law-Garzav. State, 369 S.W.2d
36 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1963). Defendant was
convicted of murder. On appeal defendant contended that his prosecution for murder violated
the guarantee against double jeopardy and deprived him of due process of law, since he had
previously been adjudicated a delinquent child
for having committed the act for which he was
prosecuted and convicted. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed and ordered the
prosecution dismissed, holding that where defendant was adjudicated a delinquent child by
the Juvenile Court on the sole basis that before
he was 17 years of age he committed the identical
offense for which he was subsequently indicted and
convicted after he reached the age of 17, the

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASFS

subsequent prosecution and conviction violated
principles of fundamental fairness and constituted
a deprivation of due process of law. The Court did
not reach the question of double jeopardy.
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that his right to cross-examine the complaining
witness was completely denied. The Supreme

Court of Washington affirmed, holding that where
the unrecorded preliminary hearing "testimony"
of the complaining witness, who died (from causes
Due Process of Law-Lane v. Warden, 320 unrelated to the alleged offense) before reF.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963). See Right to a Fair spondent's trial, was introduced as evidence at
the trial in the form of recollections of an assistant
Trial, infra.
prosecutor and a court clerk as to the substance of
Due Process of Law-State v. Gallegos, 384 her testimony, respondent was denied due process
P.2d 967 (Wyo. 1963). See Police Power, infra. of law by complete denial of an opportunity to
confront and cross-examine the complaining
Due Process of Law-State v. Swenson, 382 witness, inasmuch as respondent could not himself
P.2d 614 (Wash. 1963); Pettit v. Rhay, 383 P.2d
cross-examine the witness at the preliminary
889 (Wash. 1963). The Supreme Court of Washing- hearing because of his extremely limited education
ton has recently decided two cases wherein unfair and past mental illness, and the judge at the
limitation or effective denial of the right to con- preliminary hearing refused his request to appoint
front and cross-examine one's accusers was found counsel for the purpose of cross-examination.
to violate due process.
[The Court characterized Pettit as an example of
In State v. Swenson, defendant was convicted of a case where no meaningful cross-examination of
murder for procuring one Arthur Ferguson to kill the witness could be made, and cited the earlier
another. Aside from the substantively identical Swenson case for the proposition that even mere
testimony of Arthur Ferguson and his wife, hindrances to the right of confrontation and
Virginia, all the evidence in the case was con- cross-examination can result in essential unsistent with defendant's innocence. On appeal, fairness in violation of due process. While the
defendant contended that her right to cross- Pettit case notes that the Sixth Amendment right
examine Virginia was impaired because of the to confrontation has not been imposed on the
latter's emotional collapse during cross-examina- states through the Fourteenth Amendment, both
tion on several occasions, the consequent concern cases appear to rest on the principle that, in
demonstrated by the trial judge for the obviously certain circumstances, denial or impairment of the
pregnant witness's health, interruption of the right to confrontation can result in denial of a
testimony by frequent and prolonged recesses, and fair trial and hence in denial of Fourteenth Amendoutbursts by spectators. Noting that as to con- ment due process.]
fessed murderer Arthur's testimony, defendant
was protected by legal and logical inferences,
Equal Protection of the Laws-Coffman
v.
since Arthur's testimony as to defendant's pro- Bomar, 220 F. Supp. 343 (M.D. Tenn. 1963).
curement of the murder "came from a polluted Petitioner was convicted in the Criminal Court of
source" and bolstered Arthur's defense of mental Washington County, Tennessee, of robbery by
irresponsibility, and noting that as to the testi- use of a deadly weapon, and his available postmony of Virginia, who was never charged, de- conviction remedy in the state courts-motion for
fendant was not so protected, the Supreme Court new trial-was denied. On application for writ of
of Washington reversed and ordered a new trial, habeas corpus in the District Court for the Middle
holding that the combined circumstances sub- District of Tennessee, petitioner contended that
stantially impaired defendant's right to cross- failure of the court-appointed attorneys who
examine Virginia, and, in view of the crucial represented him at the trial to perfect an appeal
materiality of Virginia's testimony, deprived
to the Supreme Court of Tennessee at his request
defendant of substantive due process of law.
constituted a denial by the State of his Fourteenth
Respondent in Pettit v. Rhay was convicted of Amendment rights to due process of law and equal
rape, and the Superior Court granted his petition protection of the laws. The District Court granted
for habeas corpus. On appeal by the Superintendthe writ, directing that petitioner be delivered to
ent of the Penitentiary, respondent contended
the custody of the Sheriff and District Attorney-
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General for Washington County, Tennessee, if
these officials intend to retry petitioner, and that
petitioner be released from custody forthwith if
they do not intend to retry him, holding that
United States Supreme Court cases have dearly
settled the proposition that, while a state may not
be constitutionally required to provide an appellate system in criminal cases, if it elects to do
so, the equal protection clause demands that
indigent defendants be accorded substantially the
same opportunities to the effective benefits of the
appellate system as non-indigents; that one can
appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court as a matter
of right, after denial of motion for new trial,
upon filing of a bill of exceptions within a specified
time; that since pertinent Tennessee statutes
[TENN. CoDE ANN. §40-2010 to 2013] impose upon
court-appointed counsel at least the duty to take
the necessary procedural steps to effectuate an
appeal, any default by such attorneys must be
attributed to the state for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes; and consequently, failure of petitioner's
court-appointed counsel to perfect an appeal
pursuant to his request constituted a denial of
equal protection by the State. Noting that the
proper order would be to direct that petitioner be
released unless provided with an appeal within a
reasonable time, but that existing state statutes
prevented the Tennessee Supreme Court from
obtaining appellate jurisdiction, the District
Court held that the proper course was to award
petitioner the maximum relief he could have
obtained, had his appeal been properly perfected
and had he been successful in obtaining a reversal
and new trial; therefore, the Court directed that
petitioner either be accorded a new trial or be
released from custody.
Evidence-Husband-Wife Privilege-Stale v.
Bromn, 383 P.2d 930 (Utah 1963). Defendant was
convicted of rape. On appeal, defendant contended
that the district attorney's comment to the jury
that defendant's wife, the one person who could
substantiate defendant's alibi, did not testify, was
prejudicial error. The Supreme Court of Utah
reversed with directions to grant a new trial, holaing that the comment complained of effectively
destroyed the state constitutional and statutory
privilege of a husband and wife not to testify for or
against each other, and constituted prejudicial
error as to defendant.

Habeas Corpus-United States ex rel. Mancini
v. Rundle, 219 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963). See
Search and Seizure, infra.
Habeas Corpus-Williams v. State, 155 So. 2d
322 (Ala. App. 1963), cert. denied, 155 So. 2d 323
(Ala. 1963). While on parole from the Alabama
state penitentiary, where he had been incarcerated
for first degree murder, petitioner applied for writ
of habeas corpus. On appeal from the Circuit
Court's denial of his petition for the writ, petitioner
[apparently] contended that even though he was
on parole, he was nonetheless not at complete
liberty and hence was sufficiently restrained of
freedom to be entitled to the benefit of habeas
corpus. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that habeas corpus would lie only if the
applicant was actually restrained of his liberty, and
that one on parole was not restrained from freedom
of action to the extent that habeas corpus would be
available. The Court noted that Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, abstracted at 54 J. Cim. L.,
C. & P.S. 190 (1963) (parolee sufficiently "in custody" to obtain federal habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. §2241) was inapplicable.
Informers-People v. Durr, 192 N.E.2d 379
(Ill. 1963). Defendant was convicted of unlawful
possession of narcotics. On writ of error, defendant
contended that the search which yielded evidence
used against him was unlawful, inasmuch as it was
incident to defendant's arrest, which was predicated solely on information furnished to the arresting officer by an informer whose identity the trial
court refused to compel the police to disclose.
Stating that "the basic question here is as to
whether the right of the individual to protection
against the harassment of unreasonable searches
and false arrests is superior to the necessity of
protecting the public against the evils of organized crime," the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the Government has a privilege,
designed to encourage citizens in their obligation to aid in enforcement of the law by preserving their anonymity, to withhold names of those
furnishing information concerning crimes; that
there was no constitutional compulsion to recognize a "right to information completely irrelevant to the question of innocence, disclosure
of which would seriously hamper effective law
enforcement"; and that determination of probable
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cause from the arresting officer's testimony regarding the reliability of an otherwise anonymous
informer would likely produce less evils than those
resulting from abolishment of the informer privilege.
Informers-State v. Beck, 191 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio
1963). Defendant was convicted of possessing
clearinghouse (policy) slips, a misdemeanor, and
the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, defendant contended that illegally obtained evidence
was used against him, and that the trial court erred
in refusing to compel disclosure of the name of an
informer upon whose information the police in part
relied for probable cause to arrest defendant. The
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, holding that since
the seizure of the clearinghouse slips was incident
to defendant's lawful arrest without a warrant, the
evidence was not the product of an unlawful search
and thus was properly admitted; and that in absence of a showing that disclosure of the informer's
name would have been of any real value to defendant, defendant was not entitled to the informer's name, since the policy against disclosure,
based upon the desire to protect and encourage
informers and to keep open the avenues by which
they obtain information important to the police,
would be outweighed only by compelling considerations. Two judges dissented, stating that
defendant's arrest was unlawful and the evidence
complained of inadmissible regardless of the
existence of probable cause, inasmuch as defendant's arrest without a warrant was for a misdemeanor not committed in the arresting officers'
presence.
Insanity-Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th
Cir. 1963). See Due Process of Law, supra.
Insanity-French v. DistrictCourt, 384 P.2d 268
(Colo. 1963). Petitioner filed application seeking
alternative relief, by prohibition or mandamus, to
compel the trial court wherein criminal charges
were pending against petitioner to allow him to
reenter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Respondent trial court contended that in order to
maintain a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity,
petitioner must submit to mental examination as
provided by statute, and that intentional frustration of the operation of the statute warranted the
court's striking of the insanity plea. The Supreme
Court of Colorado granted relief, holding that peti-
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tioner cotld not be compelled to carry on conversations against his will under the penalty of forfeiture of the insanity defense for failure or refusal
to "cooperate" with physicians; and that the
statute prescribing the procedures to be followed
upon entry of an insanity plea could not operate to
destroy petitioner's constitutional safeguards
against self-incrimination.
Insanity-Spurlock v. State, 368 S.W.2d 299
(Tenn. 1963). Defendant was convicted of petit
larceny on a stipulation that he committed the
acts charged. On appeal, defendant contended that
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
on the issue of criminal responsibility in terms of
the Durham rule, since the strict "right andwrong"
McNaghten test violated due process. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed, holding that
due process did not require a state to eliminate the
McNaghten test and substitute any other test of
criminal responsibility [citing Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790 (1952)]; and that the McNaghten
test, though condemned by the weight of medical
authority, should be adhered to as the only safe
standard under which a proper administration of
justice can be had.
Insanity-State v. Park, 193 A.2d 1 (Me. 1963).
Defendant was convicted of murder. On exceptions to the trial court's refusal to give requested
instructions to the jury, defendant contended that
a mental disease or defect not destroying total
criminal responsibility could nonetheless reduce
the degree of the homicide he committed from
murder to manslaughter; that the jury should have
been informed of the consequences [compulsory
commitment to a mental institution] of a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity; and that the trial
court erroneously instructed the jury that defendant bore the burden of establishing insanity by
a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine overruled the exceptions,
entered judgment for the State and remanded for
sentence, holding that no rule of partial or limited
responsibility existed in Maine under the McNaghten Rule, and nothing inherent in Maine's
new test of criminal responsibility [ME. REv.
STAT. ch. 149, §38-A (1961)], a modified Durham
rule, required creation of a new twilight zone of responsibility; that the trial court properly refused
to instruct the jury as to consequences of the verdict, since the function of the jury is to find the
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facts and to apply the law as given by fhe court,
with no concern for whatever may transpire after
the verdict, regardless of the fact that under the
Durham Rule, which §38-A closely follows, the
District of Columbia courts hold otherwise on this
point; and since there was no reason to change the
burden of proving insanity under the 1961 Act
from the burden imposed under the earlier Maine
rule, the trial court correctly charged the jury concerning burden of proof of insanity. The Court
noted that, although the District of Columbia
courts operating under Durham require the
Government to prove sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt once defendant introduces some evidence of
mental disorder, those courts had imposed that
burden prior to the decision of Durham.
[This case indicates that a state adopting the
basic test of criminal responsibility defined by the
Durham Rule may nonetheless limit the operation
of the rule by refusing to adopt liberal District of
Columbia procedures for administering the basic
test.]

commercial instrument which is of value to its

Interstate Transportation of False SecuritiesUnited States v. Mingo, 217 F. Supp. 729 (M.D.
Fla. 1963); Barack v. United States, 317 F.2d 619
(9th Cir. 1963). Two federal courts have recently
considered the question whether invoices or
vouchers signed by the user of a credit card constitute "securities" within 18 U.S.C. §2311, and
have reached opposite results.
In United States v. Mingo, the District Court for
the Middle District of Florida held that the Cities
Service invoice in question was an "evidence of
indebtedness" within the statutory definition of
"securities," since such an invoice was treated as
cash in inter-oil company transactions, and because, regardless of whether the person who
signed the invoice was the lawful holder of the
credit card, the invoice was an acknowledgment
by the credit card holder of his indebtedness to the
oil company for the purchase price of the merchandise stated on the invoice.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled
in Barack v. United States that Hilton Carte
Blanche charge vouchers [which apparently served
the same function in the credit card operation as
did the invoice in the Mingo case] were not evidences of indebtedness and hence not securities
within the statute, since the statute by its context
requires that, for an item to be deemed an "evidence of indebtedness," it must be intended as a

Juvenile Proceedings-Garza v. State, 369 S.W.
2d 36 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1963). See Due Process
of Law, supra.

holder, and the vouchers in question did not satisfy
this test.
Juries-State v. Prevost, 193 A.2d 22 (N.H.
1963). Defendant was convicted of second degree
murder. On exceptions reserved, defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing the State to exercise a peremptory challenge to a juror who previously had been accepted
by counsel for the State and the defense but before
the jury was sworn. Noting that the question was
one of first impression in New Hampshire, the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, holding that before the jury panel was sworn, the trial
court had discretionary authority to allow the
State (or the defense) to peremptorily challenge a
juror who had been accepted by both sides. The
Court noted that the rule adopted was consistent
with the prac.tice of placing the primary reponsibility for the selection of an impartial jury on the
court, rather than on counsel.

Larceny-Lamere v. State, 370 S.W.2d 466
(Tenn. 1963). Defendants were convicted of robbery as defined by TENN. CODE ANNr. §39-4207. On
appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion
for new trial, defendants contended that the file of
papers which they stole from their attorney's office
could not be the subject of larceny, since, as clients
of the attorney, defendants had the right to possession of at least some portion of the file, and to
constitute larceny, the taking must be without any
claim or color of right. Noting that the case presented a novel situation in Tennessee, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee affirmed, holding that since
defendants had no possible right or color of right
to possession of the whole file without the attorney's consent and prior to payment to him of a
reasonable fee for services rendered, defendants
could be guilty of larceny of at least a portion of
the file which was the attorney's property; and
consequently, defendants were not precluded, as a
matter of law, from being found guilty as charged.
Narcotics-State v. Walker, 154 So. 2d 368 (La.
1963). Relators were convicted of habitually using
narcotics to the extent that they became addicts.
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ant's sentence from 25 years to 20 years and
affirmed as modified, holding that the County
Attorney's reference to the fact that convicts are
generally released after serving only about half of
their sentences required modification of the sentence in the interests of justice, because the jury,
as an arm of the judicial branch of the government,
should not speculate on such prospective matters
as defendant's conduct in the penitentiary and the
awards he may receive for good behavior, which
matters are to be administered by an arm of the
executive branch of the government. The Court
expressly overruled Hardernanv. State, 175 Pac.
948 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App.-1918), insofar as that
case held such comment permissible "because it is
the law and everyone is presumed to know it."
[Hardeman, which the Oklahoma Court expressly
Penalty-Heriandez v. State, 366 S.W.2d 575 overruled, seems identical in principle to the
(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1963); Cooper v. State, 365 Cooper case. However, the fact that the jury acS.W.2d 793 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1963); Bell v. quired its knowledge re possible post-sentence conState, 381 P.2d 167 (Okla. Ct. Grim. App. 1962); quences from the prosecutor in Bell but from a felPeople v. Ketchel, 30. Cal. Rptr. 538 (1963); Peple low juror in Cooper might well be a significant
v. Shipp, 31 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1963). The courts of reason for departing from that principle in Bell.]
The California Supreme Court was confronted
three states have recently decided five cases concernmg the permissible scope of argument to the by the question with regard to capital punishment.
In People v. Ketehel, two defendants sentenced to
jury on the issue of penalty.
The Texas and Oklahoma Courts of Criminal death for first degree murder contended that the
Appeals considered the question in three non- prosecutor's arguments that, because of the possicapital cases. In Hernandez, the Court of Criminal bility of parole, if "life imprisonment" is the
Appeals of Texas reversed and remanded defend- penalty, "these men will once again walk the
ant's conviction, holding that the County Attor- streets," and that the death penalty would deter
"potential killers," constituted prejudicial error in
ney's argument ["when he has been rehabilitated
...they will turn him loose"], which, in effect, told the penalty phase of the case. The Court reversed
the jury it did not matter how long a term was and remanded as to the issue of penalty only, holdassessed, was an incorrect statement of the law ing that in raising the possibility of parole under a
calculated to prejudice defendant's rights, since life imprisonment sentence, the People did not
"it is the duty of the jury to assess the punishment commit error, since this consideration is one of the
which appears to be just and proper according to facts involved in determining the issue of punishthe evidence and within the limits prescribed by ment; but since the Legislature had left the fixing
law." In Cooper v. State, defendant urged reversal of punishment for first degree murder to the jury's
for jury misconduct, in that the foreman had con- absolute discretion, and there was no legislative
vinced jurors who had favored a lesser punishment finding, nor was it a matter of common knowledge,
to assess a sentence of 18 months, by telling them that capital punishment was or was not a more
effective deterrent than imprisonment, the prosethat, with credit for good behavior, defendant
would serve approximately one year in jail if sen- cution's argument on the deterrent point was pretenced to 18 months. The Texas Court of Criminal judicial to defendants. Defendant in People v.
Appeals affirmed, holding that since the informa- Shipp contended that the trial court erred in retion given by the foreman was not incorrect, and fusing to allow defendant's counsel to read to the
because it is common knowledge that an inmate jury a newspaper article, reporting an attempt in
can receive credit, defendant was not prejudiced by the Legislature to abolish the death penalty, in
the conduct complained of. The Oklahoma Court of support of his proferred argument that imposition
Criminal Appeals in Bell r. State reduced defend- of the death penalty was never morally permissible.
On certiorari from denial of their petitions for
habeas corpus, relators contended that the statute
under which they were convicted [LA. REv. STAT.
§40:962(A)] punished the mere status of addiction,
and this was unconstitutional by authority of
Robinson v. United States, 370 U.S. 660, abstracted
at 53 J. Crm. L., C. & P.S. 492 (1962) (criminal
punishment for status of addiction violates Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments). The Supreme Court
of Louisiana affirmed, holding that since the Louisiana statute penalized not the status or condition
of addiction but rather the habitual and intentional use of narcotics leading to the status of addiction, the statute was not unconstitutional under
the Robinson doctrine, and relators' petitions for
habeas corpus were correctly denied.
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The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that since, by arguing that capital punishment is
not proper in any case, counsel in effect urged the
jury to disregard the Legislature's determination
to the contrary, the line of argument was improper.
Cf. Insanity-State v. Park, 193 A.2d 1 (Me.
1963), where one of the issues was whether the
jury should be informed of the consequences of a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Police Power-State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967
(Wyo. 1963). Defendant was charged with violating Wyo. STAT. §14-23(d) (1957), his demurrer to
the information was sustained, and the trial court
dismissed the charge. On exceptions by the State,
defendant contended that the portion of the statute under which he was charged was so vague and
indefinite as to violate due process. The Supreme
Court of Wyoming overruled the State's exceptions, holding that since the statute made it a
crime "to cause, encourage, aid or contribute to
the endangering of the child's health, welfare, or
morals," without furnishing any standard as to
what "the endangering of a child's health, welfare, or morals" is, that portion of the statute was
in violation of due process.
Prejudicial Publicity-State v. Odom, 369 S.W.2d
173 (Mo. 1963).Defendant was convicted of forcible
rape and was sentenced to death. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motions for change of venue,
since pretrial newspaper, radio, and television publicity concerning defendant's case rendered a fair
and impartial trial in Jasper County impossible.
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding
that, even if the publicity complained of in fact
was prejudicial to defendant's right to be tried by
an impartial jury in jasper County, denial of
defendant's motions did not constitute an abuse of
discretion, since he had moved for a change of
venue from Jasper County to Lawrence County,
and there was no evidence to indicate that the
widely publicized newspaper, radio, and television
reports did not circulate as widely in Lawrence
County as they did in Jasper County.
Prejudicial Publicity-State v. Thompson, 23
N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 1963). Defendant Tilmer
Eugene Thompson, under indictment for first degree murder for having procured another to
murder his wife, unsuccessfully moved the District

Court of Ramsey County for change of venue. On
application for mandamus to compel the District
Court to transfer the venue of the action to Hennepin County, defendant contended that so much
publicity had been given his case that it would be
impossible to obtain an impartial jury in Ramsey
County. The Supreme Court of Minnesota issued
the writ, holding that examination of numerous
newspaper aiticles subrniitted to the trial court
convinced the Supreme Court that it was highly
unlikely that defendant could obtain an impartial
trial in Ramsey County; and although ordinarily
a defendant on motion for change of venue is not
permitted to select the county to which the venue
should be changed, defendant's request would be
granted, since he had chosen Hennepin County as
a place where he believed he could obtain as fair a
trial as could be obtained.
Right to a Fair Trial-Hudsonv. State, 132 S.E.2d
508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963). Defendant was convicted
of altering instruments. On appeal from the trial
court's denial of her motion for a new trial, defendant contended that where the trial judge over
her objection permitted a microphone connected to
a tape recorder to be placed near her counsel's
table in the courtroom for purposes of subsequent
radio broadcast of a tape recording of the trial,
defendant was deprived of her constitutional
rights to effective assistance of counsel and to a
fair and impartial trial. Noting that the question
was one of first impression, the Court of Appeals of
Georgia reversed, holding that a trial court has
not only the inherent power but the duty to keep
the courtroom free of distractions and conditions
prejudicial to an accused, even though such distractions may emanate from representatives of the
press; that where the microphone, which was so
sensitive that it could pick up the voices of witnesses and the trial judge, was within five feet of defendant's counsel's table, defendant and her
counsel were reasonably apprehensive that the
microphone would be sensitive enough to pick up
their whispered conversation; that allowance of
the microphone in the courtroom prejudiced defendant's rights to a fair and impartial trial and
hindered defendant and her counsel in the conduct
of her defense; and consequently, the trial court's
overruling of defendant's objection to the presence
of the microphone constituted error requiring reversal of the judgment overruling defendant's
motion for new trial.
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Right to a Fair Trial-Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d
179 (4th Cir. 1963). After being convicted in a
Maryland state court on three indictments for
narcotics violations and sentenced as an habitual
offender, petitioner exhausted his state remedies.
On appeal from the Federal District Court's denial
of his application for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended that, at the beginning of his trial,
the State read to the jury indictments containing
averments of prior narcotics offenses, thus depriving him of a fair and impartial trial as required by
Fourteenth Amendment due process. The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded with instructions that petitioner be released from respondent's custody unless the State
of Maryland takes appropriate steps to grant
petitioner a new trial, holding that while the federal
constitution does not require the states to provide
jury trials in criminal cases, where a jury trial is
provided, due process demands that the jury be
fair and impartial; that recognizing the probable
harmful and prejudicial effects of informing the
jury of prior convictions, in that the jury will
likely prejudge one with a bad record and deny him
a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge, federal and state courts have established
rules of evidence strictly limiting those instances
in which the jury may properly be informed of a
defendant's criminal record and requiring reversal
where these limits are transgressed; that in the
instant case, where the disclosure could readily
have been avoided by some alternative procedure
for sentencing petitioner as an habitual offender
after the issue of his guilt had been decided, information of a character generally acknowledged
to be prejudicial to one accused of crime was nonetheless revealed to the jury before any evidence
was offered; and consequently, the reading to the
jury at the commencement of petitioner's trial of
that part of the indictments regarding his prior
narcotics convictions destroyed the impartiality of
the jury and denied petitioner due process of law.
The Court stated that a jury was most likely to be
biased by knowledge of prior convictions and for
that reason to fail to meet due process standards
where, as here, the prior convictions were for the
same kind of offenses as those for which petitioner
was on trial.
[To this writer's knowledge, this 'is the first
federal case granting habeas corpus to a state
prisoner on the ground that mere knowledge by
the jury of a prior conviction rendered the jury
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incapable of reaching that fair and impartial
verdict which due process requires.]
Right to a Fair Trial-Statev. Johnson, 383 P.2d
326 (Idaho 1963). Defendant was convicted of
forgery. On appeal, defendant contended that the
allegations in the information setting forth his previous convictions for habitual criminal purposes
should not have been read to the jury, since this
procedure was highly prejudicial to defendant and
had the effect of denying him a fair trial. The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed and remanded
with directions that the trial court permit amendment of the information 'consonant with this
opinion and permit defendant to plead to such
amended information, holding that allowing the
jury to know of a criminal defendant's prior convictions is extremely prejudicial to his right to a
fair trial; that absent legislative direction, the
Supreme Court of Idaho not only had the authority
but also the duty to adopt procedure designed to
safeguard the rights of an accused to a fair and
impartial trial; and that henceforth a new procedure re habitual offender informations must be
had, whereby the jury will acquire no knowledge
as to a defendant's prior convictions unless the
jury first finds the defendant guilty of the particular offense charged and then inquires into the
habitual offender issue.
Right To Be Tried in County Where Crime
Was Committed-Lester v. State, 370 S.W.2d 405
(Tenn. 1963). Defendant was convicted of shooting
and killing his son. On appeal, defendant contended that reversible error was committed when
his motion for new trial was heard in a county
other than that within which the crime was committed and the case tried, since TNN. CONST. art.
I, §9 requires the accused to be tried in the county
where the crime was committed. Noting that the
point was one of first impression, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee affirmed, holding that a hearing of a motion for new trial was deemed not to be
part of the trial in determining the closely related
question whether the constitutional requirement
that an accused be present at his trial demanded
his presence at such a hearing; that the same reasoning should be applied to the instant case, with
the result that a hearing on a motion for new trial
does not constitute part of the trial for purposes of
the constitutional provision that an accused must
be tried in the county where the offense occurred;
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and consequently, hearing the motion for -new
trial in a county different from that within which
the crime was committed and the trial held was
not error.

eavesdropping would still be available upon retrial;
and consequently, the eavesdropping here committed vitiated the entire criminal proceeding and
compelled dismissal of the charges.

Right to Counsel-United States ex rel. Craig v.
Right to Confrontation-State v. Swenson, 382
P.2d 614 (Wash. 1963); Pettit v. Rhay, 383 P.2d Myers, 220 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Pa. 1963). Peti889 (Wash. 1963). See Due Process of Law, supra. tioner, convicted in the Pennsylvania state courts

Right to Counsel-Hudson v. State, 132 S.E.2d
508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963). See Right to a Fair Trial,
supra.

Right to Counsel-State v. Black, 132 S.E.2d 5
(S.C. 1963). Defendant was convicted of assault
with intent to ravish and sentenced to death.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial
court's refusal to grant his motion for continuance
because of illness of one of his attorneys constituted denial of his right to effective assistance of
counsel. The Supreme Court of South Carolina
reversed and remanded, holding that where the
court had appointed three attorneys to represent
defendant at the trial of this capital case, and
denial of defendant's motion for continuance during illness of Mr. Hanna, the most experienced of
the attorneys, prevented Mr. Hanna's full participation in the trial, defendant was deprived of
the representation to which the court in appointing
the three attorneys had determined he was entitled.
Right to Counsel-Ske v. Cory, 382 P.2d 1019
(Wash. 1963). Defendant was convicted on five
counts of burglary and larceny. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in
denying his motions to dismiss the case, since he
was deprived of effective assistance of counsel
when sheriff's officers eavesdropped on his conversations with his attorney. The Supreme Court of
Washington set aside the judgment and sentence
and dismissed the charges against defendant, holding that effective representation by counsel could
not be had without the right of a defendant to
confer with his counsel in private; that the essential privacy was destroyed when sheriff's officers
eavesdropped upon conversations between 'defendant and his attorney through a microphone installed in a room in the county jail provided for
attorney consultation; that where right to counsel
bad been denied by eavesdropping, granting a new
trial was not an adequate remedy, inasmuch as any
information gained by the prosecution via the

in 1931 for a noncapital offense, exhausted his state
remedies, Commonwealth ex rd. Craig v. Banmiller,
189 A.2d 875 (Pa.), abstracted at 54 J. Cnnx. L.,
C. & P.S. 501 (1963). On application for writ of
habeas corpus, petitioner contended that, as conceded by the Commonwealth, his request for counsel at the trial was refused; and consequently, the
detention pursuant to his conviction was unconstitutional and the writ should issue, since Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, abstracted at 54 J.
CaI=. L., C. & P.S. 193 (1963) (accused entitled
to counsel in non-capital state criminal prosecutions) should be applied retroactively to his case.
The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted the writ, holding that, despite the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's decision that Gideon was not to be applied retrospectively, Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Banmiller,
supra, the proposition that "Rights which reach
constitutional stature in 1963 were of the same
magnitude in 1931" controls the instant case; and
consequently, Gideon applied to petitioner's case,
and habeas corpus must lie. To illustrate the
validity of its decision as to the retroactivity of
the Gideon case, the District Court noted that
approximately one month after that case was decided, the United States Supreme Court remanded
18 pending cases "'for further consideration in
light of Gideon v. Wainwright .....' "and that by
remanding the case of Gideon himself the Supreme
Court had retrospectively applied a constitutional right.
Right to Counsel-Weeks v. State, 156 So. 2d 36
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Dias v. State, 155 So. 2d
662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Commonwealth ex
rel. Dickerson v. Rundle, 192 A.2d 347 (Pa. 1963).
The courts of two states have recently considered
the question whether a state must appoint counsel
to represent an indigent who seeks collaterally to
attack his conviction, reaching opposite results.
In Weeks v. State, the Third District Court of
Appeal of Florida had granted defendant's request
for appointment of counsel to assist him in appeal-

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES

ing from denial of his motion to vacate judgment
and sentence. [The motion, which constituted a
collateral attack on the judgment, was authorized
by FLA. CaJm. PROC. RmrEn 1, patterned after 28
U.S.C. §2255.1 The State moved to vacate this
order, contending that an indigent's right to appointment of counsel for appellate purposes was
limited to direct appeal from the original judgment,
and did not extend to appeals from orders denying
collateral relief. The Court denied the State's motion, stating, "Since it has been decided [by
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, abstracted at
54 J. CRui. L., C. & P.S. 193 (1963)] that a failure
to provide counsel for an indigent on a direct review of his conviction is a violation of his constitutional rights, we think it reasonable to conclude
that it would be no less a violation of those rights
to deny him counsel on appellate review of collateral proceedings attacking his conviction on
constitutional grounds." Expressly adopting the
Third District's view as stated in the Weeks case,
the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida in
Dias v. State granted defendant's motion for appointment of counsel to represent him on appeal
from denial of his Rule 1 motion to vacate.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth ex rel. Dickerson v. Rundle, affirmed the
lower court's denial of petitioner's application for
habeas corpus despite petitioner's contention that
he had been denied appointment of counsel to
represent him in bringing the habeas corpus action,
stating, "We know of no legal or constitutional
requirement that counsel be appointed to represent
individuals who institute actions in habeas corpus."
[The Pennsylvania court noted that petitioner had
counsel at his trial and on direct appeal, and that
each question raised in the habeas corpus petition
had been unsuccessfully argued on direct appeal.]
Right to Free Transcript-State ex rt. Banaci v.
Boles, 131 S.W.2d 722 (W. Va. 1963). Petitioner
was convicted of armed robbery. On application
for habeas corpus, petitioner, an indigent, contended that he was denied equal protection of the
laws when the State, on the ground that no funds
were available, denied his request for transcript of
the proceedings for purposes of prosecuting an
appeal or writ of error. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia ordered petitioner discharged, holding that the State's denial of petitioner's request for transcript constituted denial
of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal pro-
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tection of the laws; that under the circumstances,
it could not be said that petitioner's failure to
apply for a writ of mandamus to compel production of the desired transcript at a time when effective relief might have been afforded (i.e., before
time to appeal or to obtain a new trial had expired) precluded him from relief by means of
habeas corpus; and because, for purposes of deciding the instant case, it must be assumed that
errors were committed at the trial which would
have resulted in reversal of petitioner's conviction
had he been able to pursue the proper appellate
procedure, and since the prescribed time to appeal
or to order a new trial had expired, petitioner was
entitled to be completely discharged, there being
no other method by means of which to secure him
a vindication of his rights. Presiding Judge Berry
dissented, stating, "[I]n the mandamus proceeding,
which was available to him, he would not have been
allowed to go scot free if guilty and [ifi there were
no errors committed at the trial; but in this habeas
corpus proceeding, instituted after the time for
appellate relief has expired, he will be reeased...
regardless of his guilt, and whether or not errors
were committed. at the trial."
[In reaching its decision that petitioner's failure
to seek mandamus when that remedy could have
resulted in effective relief (i.e., when, for practical
purposes, the remedy was available) did not
amount to waiver of his right to attack his unconstitutional detention by way of habeas corpus, the
Court applied by analogy the reasoning of Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, abstracted at 54 J. CRm. L.,
C. & P.S. 334 (1963). Since Noia's failure to appeal
in the state courts when appeal was available was
based upon his fear of retrial with possible imposition of the death penalty, the United States
Supreme Court found no waiver justifying denial
of federal habeas corpus relief. No such circumstances attended petitioner Banach's failure to
seek mandamus; rather, his course of action resembled the kind of deliberate circumvention of
orderly state procedures which, said the United
States Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia, would be
deemed waiver.]
Scientific Evidence-Photographs-Wilkins v.
State, 155 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1963). Defendants were
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
death. On appeal, defendants contended that the
trial court erred in admitting in evidence color
photographs of the scene of the crime as it ap-
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peared when local authorities arrived. Noting that
the question of admissibility of color photographs
was one of first impression in Florida, the Florida
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even though
certain scenes may appear more gruesome when
depicted in color than in black and white, the
proper test of admissibility of photographs,
applicable uniformly both to color and black and
white photographs, was one of relevancy.
Scientific Evidence-Regiscope PhotographsSisk v. State, 192 A.2d 108 (Md. 1963). Defendant
was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses. On appeal, defendant contended that a
Regiscope photograph was improperly admitted
as evidence against him. The Maryland Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the
admissibility of photographs made by a Regiscope
(a device for simultaneously photographing a
cashed check and the individual cashing it) should
be governed by the same principles as those governing the admissibility of ordinary photographs; and
that where no competent extrinsic evidence-i.e.,
no testimonial sponsor-showed the photograph
to be a fair representation of what it purported to
represent, the Regiscope photograph should not
have been admitted, and its admission was prejudicial to defendant.
Search and Seizure-Lane v. United States, 321
F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963). Defendant was convicted
of violating federal narcotics and tax laws by importing, concealing, and failing to pay tax on
heroin. On appeal, defendant contended that the
District Court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the heroin on the ground that it was obtained in violation of both his Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable search and seizure and
his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
holding that where federal customs agents, who
had reasonable cause to believe that defendant had
been or was violating federal narcotics importation
laws, obtained a bindle of heroin when defendant
regurgitated it as a result of an emetic administered at a hospital to which the agents took hima
for that purpose following a fruitless external
search of his person, the heroin was not obtained
as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure,
inasmuch as defendant, though reluctant to take
the emetic, did so himself without force exerted
by the agents, and in light of the latitude allowed

customs agents when searching for contraband
they suspect is being imported; and since the
agents' conduct was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, there was no violation of Fifth
Amendment due process. The Court noted that
official conduct resulting in removal of evidence
from inside an accused has been held unreasonable
where force and untoward acts on the person and
property of the accused were involved, and that
"hiding dope in the internal body cavities and recovering it b regurgitation or excretion is a common method of smuggling dope."
Search and Seizure-People v. Parham, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 497 (1963). In another phase of the Parham
case, see Discovery, supra, the California Supreme
Court refused to reverse defendant's conviction on
the ground that evidence obtained in violation of
due process had been admitted against him, holding that where it was not reasonably probable that
admission of the unconstitutionally seized evidence
affected the result of the trial, reversal would not
follow. The Court reasoned that the principle underlying the exclusionary rule-that the state must
not be Mlowed to profit from its own wrong-is
absent when the evidence in question did not
affect the result of the trial.
Search and Seizure-State v. Pina,383 P.2d 167
(Ariz. 1963). Defendant was convicted of illegal
possession of heroin. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erroneously admitted
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search
and seizure. The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed and remanded, holding that where, pursuant
to a search warrant, police officers searched defendant's residence at 3: 00 p.m. and found no narcotics, then at 7: 00 p.m. the same day, without obtaining a further warrant, searched the house
again and found narcotics, the earlier search could
not serve as legal basis for the second, since a
second search based on the same warrant is an
unreasonable search; that Mrs. Pina did not waive
defendant's constitutional rights when she permitted the officers to reenter the house at 7:00
p.m., since one spouse is not impliedly authorized
to waive the other's basic constitutional rights;
and consequently, since the search which yielded
narcotics was neither reasonable nor consented to
by defendant, the evidence complained of should
not have been admitted against defendant.
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Search and Seizure-United States ex rel. Mancini v. Rundle, 219 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
Petitioner was convicted in a Pennsylvania state
court of various offenses related to theft on June
19, 1961, the day on which Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, abstracted at 52 J. CnI. L., C. & P.S. 292
(1961), was decided. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment on appeal, 184
A.2d 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962), abstracted at 54
J. CRm. L., C. & P.S. 196 (1963), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for an allocatur, and the United States
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari. On application for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner
contended that evidence seized in violation of his
federal constitutional rights had been admitted at
his trial, and that Mapp v. Ohio applied to his case
and required exclusion of such evidence. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the writ, staying issuance for 60
days during which time Pennsylvania could either
seek review of this decision or determine to retry
petitioner, holding that since the complaint on
which the search warrant issued was unsworn and
recited no facts from which a determination of
probable cause could be made, the warrant was
invalid by both Pennsylvania and federal constitutional standards, and the search and seizure
made pursuant thereto were illegal; that petitioner's failure to apply for habeas corpus in the
state courts did not prevent him from applying
for federal habeas corpus, inasmuch as recent
Pennsylvania decisions demonstrated that, for all
practical purposes, petitioner had exhausted his
state remedies; that because of the "accident of
time," petitioner was able to and did press his
newly recognized constitutional rights at every
level of the Pennsylvania court system, and extending Mapp to this particular case would not necessarily compel fully retroactive application of Mapp
to cases where the claim was not so urged in the
state courts; and consequently, petitioner would
be protected by the Mapp case from being convicted on the basis of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence, and habeas corpus must issue.
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Self-Incrimination-French v. Distrid Court,
384 P.2d 268 (Colo. 1963). See Insanity, supra.
Speedy Trial-State v. Hall, 123 N.W.2d 116
(Minn. 1963); State en rel. Fredenberg v. Byrne,
State ex rel. Fredenberg v. Bennett, 123 N.W.2d 305
(Wis. 1963). The highest courts of two states have
recently considered the question whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial requires a state
to institute proceedings to remove an accused
from confinement in a federal penitentiary for
purposes of trying him on pending criminal
charges in the state.
In State v. Hall, defendant sought mandamus
directing the state trial court either to grant him
an immediate trial or to dismiss the proceeding,
alleging, inter alia, that failure to give him an immediate trial would deny him due process and
would prevent him from having access to defense
witnesses, and that the Federal Director of the
Bureau of Prisons would consent to defendant's
removal to Minnesota for trial. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota refused to grant relief, holding that
defendant had not been brought to trial only because he had placed himself beyond the jurisdiction of the Minnesota courts; and that whether
defendant would in fact be prejudiced by the delay
would be determined not now, but at his trial
after his release from the federal penitentiary.
In State ex rd. Fredenbergv. Byrne and State ex
rel Fredenbergv. Bennett (consolidated cases involving identical issues and decided in a single opinion),
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reached the
opposite result. The Court issued a writ of mandamus compelling district attorneys of two counties to attempt to have a federal prisoner brought
to Wisconsin for purposes of speedy trial, holding
that once a state commences a criminal prosecution, it has a duty to follow through and complete
it, even though defendant is incarcerated in a
federal prison. The Wisconsin court noted the view
of the "early cases" on this issue, which view was
that adopted by the Minnesota Court in the Hall
case.

